Back to the nuclear crossroads
This article was originally published at the Daily Kos.
The war in Ukraine is quickly becoming a protracted war, with Russian military might consistently bogging down in the face of heroic resistance by the Ukrainian people. However, this war also represents the much wider reality of a geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia. As such, it must be dealt with vigorously, by means of immediate measures to dramatically strengthen NATO capabilities in Eastern Europe, unflinching steps to counter Putin’s nuclear blackmail, unwavering support to the Ukrainians and, assertive diplomacy to instill some type of reality principle to the Kremlin. Yet, things must be done in such a way as won’t intractably antagonize Russia and the West, since such a scenario would easily give rise to a European war and, then, to a thermonuclear war. An article by Miguel Garrido, in Portugal.
Photo by Jorono at Pixabay
A terrorized population. A whole country, vandalized. Entire cities, encircled and besieged—huge sections of those systematically shelled and bombed, occasionally by means of such criminal implements of inhumanity as cluster munitions and thermobaric vacuum bombs. Mass migrations of millions of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, while thousands of those who remain behind are senselessly killed under siege, or even brutally murdered under occupation. And then, critical infrastructures just blown up, alongside residential areas, schools, churches, hospitals, and clinics—the arbitrary destruction of billions of dollars worth of essential, human life sustaining infrastructure. And, of course, explosive projectiles shot into the close vicinities of nuclear installations, in Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv.
Such are the impacts of the Kremlin’s brutality in Ukraine. In their strategically befuddling attempt to reassert imperial power and retrieve the old Russo-Soviet Empire’s proximal sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Moscow has already managed to destroy large sections of Ukraine, to precipitate a potentially intractable, no-win war, and, to gear the world towards a geopolitical faceoff between powers.
It must be clearly understood that Putin’s Russia will never leave Ukraine alone and, indeed, that it will not restrain itself to Ukraine. As soon as the Russians have been able to achieve a significant hold over Ukraine—particularly over the Black Sea coast and the eastern third of the country—they will, in all probability, venture into Moldova, by way of their Transnistria military enclave in the Moldovan east. Then, later, they’ll most likely turn to Georgia, at the other side of the Black Sea-Caucasus energy system.
The West must therefore engage in all possible efforts to counter Russian aggression, and effectively dissuade the Kremlin from launching any further offensives on other countries. Essential here will be sustained, consequential support for the Ukrainians, geared towards inflicting massive losses to Russian forces and, essentially, bogging them down in Ukraine—in fact, you may have noticed that the war in Ukraine has a clear potential to be turned into a new and improved version of the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s.
However, it’s also true that Russia is a thermonuclear power, and that we now find ourselves back to the nuclear crossroads. This being so, while it’s necessary to demonstrate unrelenting assertiveness towards Russian aggression, the fact is that countering Moscow must be done in such a way as will not insurmountably antagonize Russia and the West, since that would tend to drive the situation out of control. It would mean risking the unthinkable: a rapidly escalating war in Europe, ultimately turning into a thermonuclear war.
The present situation finds its most relevant precedent in nothing less than the nuclear contest between superpowers of the Cold War.
Back in the Cold War era, when you had the two superpowers engaging each other across the world, there was a tacit, mutually accepted set of ground rules. Force would be responded with force, and provocations would be responded with frontal assertiveness. However, force would be measured so it would never lead to open confrontation. Also, none of the sides would ever do anything to irreversibly aggravate the other, or to definitely collapse the diplomatic and commercial bonds between sides. There would invariably be leeway for diplomatic negotiations, and there would always be backchannels for essential negotiations. Those principles worked then, and they would certainly work now. So, let’s see how they apply to the present crisis.
The here-to approved sanctions are generally adequate. They already inflict a heavy blow on Russian finance and industry, severely punish the political elite and the oligarchs, and set the stage for mass popular disaffection towards the regime. Also, those sanctions are easily removable as soon as there’s an appropriate regime change taking place in Moscow—while, in the meantime, they don’t force Russia into complete international isolation. And, in such a way, they make it clear that the West is still available for dialogue.
There’s still a wide range of sanctions available for application to the Russian state and, to relevant Russian persons and interests. Application of those should be gradual and clearly conditional to the Kremlin’s behavior. Yet, as sanctions are being established, it’ll be essential to keep in mind that it’s necessary to preserve an essential minimum of bonds of interdependence with Russia that will allow for a successful continuity of the diplomatic process. For instance, if Europe was to fully boycott Russian natural gas, that would in itself be the end of the last great bond of interdependence between Europe and Russia, and, as such, also an end to any viable sort of diplomatic process. So, and while Europe must find other natural gas suppliers to quickly and effectively make up for its dependence on Russian gas, the fact is that, absent a state of war, it should all the same keep a bare minimum of Russian gas imports going, so as to preserve a measure of interdependence.
Sanctions must, of course, be accompanied by clear demonstrations of strength in Eastern Europe: by means of unwavering assistance to the Ukrainians, assertive support to Moldova and Georgia, and, the massive reinforcement of NATO conventional capabilities in the East.
Absolutely no policies that would put Western forces face to face with Russian forces. This of course includes the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, by which NATO forces would be in charge of protecting Ukrainian skies from Russian MiGs, helicopters and missiles. But it also includes the open conduction of Ukrainian military operations from NATO territories. For instance, having the Ukrainian air force flying out of Poland or Romania—instead, supply the Ukrainians with the state of the art in anti-aerial and anti-missile systems, so they can independently reinforce and protect any surviving airstrips in western Ukraine. Then, in the same spirit, it would be very much unreasonable to allow identifiable NATO forces to enter Ukrainian territory. Equally unthinkable is any preemptive strike against Russian or Belarusian forces. And, I really don’t need to talk about first strike options and scenarios here, or do I?
By the way, if Western governments choose to covertly send in, let’s say, special forces batallions, to assist the Ukrainians all across the territory, they should be careful to ensure that, if captured, those special forces operatives can not be legally associated to the governments who sent them in—i.e. “they got there by their own foot”.
Massively check the Russians in the East, and assist the Ukrainians by every means possible. It’s absolutely clear there needs to be a massive strengthening of NATO’s conventional capabilities in Eastern Europe. This won’t just require deeper engagement by the U.S., but also, quite clearly, significantly increased defense contributions by European countries.
Also, at another level. The Ukrainian and Moldovan and Georgian applications to the EU should be clearly and unreservedly accepted as soon as possible—or, at the very least, the EU must establish intensely deeper formal institutional bonds with those countries. Yet, it should be made explicit that accepting Finland and Sweden into NATO will come as a reciprocal response to the transformation of Belarus into a military instrument of the Russian Federation.
What’s more, Moldova and Georgia, even if they’re not going to become members of NATO anytime soon, need to be militarily reinforced by Western governments—anti-aerial and anti-tank equipments, especially those of the lightweight variety, seem to be the most appropriate option. There certainly are ways of supplying such equipments in a politically acceptable way. For one, at the formal level, it must always be those countries themselves who are seen taking the initiative to procure such equipments. And then, the deals should be preferably announced and carried out during times when the Russians are taking particularly heavy institutional and media flak for their brutal tactics in Ukraine.
Yet, considerations on diplomatic savoir faire must not prevent the West from assisting Ukraine in all possible and feasible ways. Ukraine can’t go down with the West standing by. That’s an entire people that’s being assaulted and brutalized right now, and that’s only happening for that people’s desire to belong to Europe and the West. As such, we’d better explore all possible avenues by which to help the Ukrainians.
The West needs to carry on with its mass logistical support to Ukraine. In particular, the West needs to supply them with more and more light weight anti-aerial and anti-tank weapons. The Russians have thousands of MiGs, helicopters, tanks and armored vehicles to unleash on Ukraine, and that’s the only way Russian forces get an edge in the battlefield. So, give the Ukrainians the means to fight those. And, if possible, also give them stationary anti-missile systems, for the protection of any Ukrainian cities where it’s still feasible to move such systems into.
Some have even proposed supplying weaponry, equipment and goods to the Ukrainians under a Lend-Lease program. Why not? In a deep sense, it would be very much appropriate to assist Ukraine under a program dating back to the fight against Nazi imperial aggression. It would add even more international and cultural legitimacy to the Ukrainian cause, it would presumably bolster international assistance for their national defense effort, and, it would further help represent the Russian invasion for what it actually is: a brutal, Nazi-like war of aggression.
Also, humanitarian assistance. Dramatically expanding aid to fleeing populations, particularly at the Polish, Moldovan and Romanian sides of the border, is indeed essential, but it’s not enough. Several Ukrainian cities are either already under siege, or about to become so. If it’s feasible at all, then why not organize humanitarian air bridges to those cities, whereby tons of supplies would be dropped by parachute? Also, placing humanitarian staff on the ground—in a strictly voluntary fashion—could be a good idea as well: even during an illegal invasion, it’s objectively harder, for a modern army, to arbitrarily assault communities where there are humanitarian and religious missions on the ground, assisting civilians and the wounded.
A diversified, closely coordinated approach. Effectively engaging with the Russians will require assertive diplomacy, conclusively backed by the massive reinforcement of NATO forces and means in Eastern Europe, and also by unwavering support to the Ukrainians. A consequential diplomatic approach to this situation will require establishing a diversified, closely coordinated approach, by which the U.S., the EU, the UK, NATO, Poland and the Baltic states, among others, carry on with a posture of intransigent force towards Russia, while other actors are used to open mutually acceptable doors for dialogue. In this latter respect, you clearly have to preserve France’s role as a privileged interlocutor of the Kremlin, while simultaneously reestablishing the mediating diplomatic roles of Germany, Austria and Hungary, Italy, and Turkey. (In other words, the countries which have been Russia’s essential trading partners in the west up to this day and, indeed, from the times immemorial of the Italian city states, and also of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.)
Any potential definite dissociation between those states and Russia would, in the context of the present crisis, represent a dangerous juncture in its own right. Instead, it would make perfect sense to have, in a spirit of Realpolitik, a minimum of two or three of those countries adopting active mediation postures with the Russians, towards some kind of productive resolutions.
What’s happening in Asia? In the meantime, and while all of this is going on, the West needs to pay proper attention to what’s going on in Asia. In other words, how are the Chinese, the Arabs, the Indians and the Central-Asians reacting to this? It doesn’t matter what they’re saying in public. What matters is what’s going on in the backstage. It’s a really simple question here: Russia is a weakened power that can only hope to resort to any consequential form of imperial adventurism if it feels it can count on massive Asian acquiescence—preferably, Chinese and Iranian backing, Central Asian solidarity, Indian and Southeast Asian acquiescence, and Arab passivity. Are those things there? If so, then the fact is the West does have its means, and it’s probably a good time to make use of them.
Instilling something like a reality principle to the Kremlin. It’s thoroughly necessary, throughout the diplomatic process, to remind the Russians that, such as Putin’s Russia will never leave Ukraine alone, so will the West never cease backing the Ukrainians—and, after that, the Moldovans and the Georgians.
Then, it’ll be necessary to tell them, yes, it’s well understood that Putin’s regime intends to carry on vandalizing Ukraine, tearing its infrastructure to shreds, collapsing Ukrainian society, destroying the Ukrainians’ military capabilities and, looting their industrial and nuclear capabilities. And, likewise, it’s fully understood that the Kremlin intends to break up Ukraine into partitions, enclaves, and provinces of the Russian Federation, and, at best, turn it into a land-locked state, with no access whatsoever to the Black Sea. However (remind them of this), the fact is that, even now, it’s not being easy. Moscow’s offensive in Ukraine is being slow, it’s hampered by serious supply and logistical issues, demoralization is rampant among Russian troops, and those same Russian troops are having a hard time battling the Ukrainians and subjugating civilian populations. The result of this is that, even though the Russians enjoy clear force superiority, the Kremlin’s offensive is bogging down, and it’s suffering casualties and losses that, despite still being hard to quantify, seem nonetheless to be considerable. To the point where the Kremlin is now having to bring Syrian mercenaries and others into Ukraine.
So, what next? With all likelihood, a protracted, intractable war. And, as the Kremlin well knows, there will never be a lack of fighters, nor of weaponry, in Ukrainian territory. Therefore, such a war will tend to be fought by means of conventional combat, but also of exotic attacks, sabotage, explosives, anti-tank mines, IEDs, anti-personnel attacks, surface-to-air missiles, etc. Such an adventure will inflict constant casualties and—in and of itself—grave economic damage to Russia. It could actually turn out to be even worse than the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s. It will seriously hurt Russia and the Russians, and, it will tend to lead to widescale discontent within Russia itself. That of course is something Russia, a weakened power that it is, can’t afford.
This being so, (remind Moscow of this) it would make perfect sense for Russia not to attempt, in any type of near future, to put itself in even direr straits by means of similar assaults on countries like Moldova, Georgia, or even others.
Next, it’ll be useful to remind them that the Russo-Soviet Empire no longer exists, and that it’s really not coming back, and that the catastrophic policies that Putin’s Kremlin is now adopting to bring it back may very well be leading Russia itself towards the same end.
After all, as the Kremlin well knows, Russia is an especially debilitated power, with its decrepit industry, its dependence on foreign technology imports, its economy absolutely relying on oil and natural gas exports, the weak average standard of living, and an ageing population of merely 145 million people—almost all of those concentrated west of the Urals. What’s more, this is a population that tends not to trust the regime, and only gives electoral majorities to Putin for Putin’s image as a ‘keeper of economic stability.’ Well, what will the Russian population think of this same Putin when the economy starts collapsing all over, and when they start seeing their boys returning home in body bags? Here, you should remind the Russians that their population has no interest whatsoever in the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions, nor in any “new great patriotic war” that Putin might conjure up.
And then you also have the oligarchs, the intelligentsia, the apparatchiks, and the generals, who (even though they’re controlled and intimidated) are growing disillusioned, and perhaps it is that they don’t even understand for sure why is it that Russia is trying to create a “new great patriotic war.”
When diplomatically interacting with the Russians, you also have to make them notice that it would be much more preferable—for Russia and the Russian people—to, rather than persisting in a failed imperial agenda, having the Kremlin instead choose to take the chance that’s represented by an attenuation of conflict: while the sanctions would not be removed, the fact is that they would not be worsened anyway, and, in the medium to long terms, it would even be possible to think of some way to soften their macroeconomic impacts.
Also, it would make very good sense to make them understand that any stabilization of this situation with a Russia that’s ruled by Putin will always result in the creation of a new Iron Curtain stretching out from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus—but that the negative economic impacts of such an Iron Curtain could be attenuated somewhat by a Cold War like continuity of relations with the West, in particular through Germany and Italy.
Challenging Putin’s nuclear blackmail. It must also be very clearly recognized that Putin is now resorting to nuclear blackmail. That’s precisely what is expressed by Putin’s constant threats to the West, by the Kremlin ordering Russian strategic forces into a state of nuclear readiness, and also, in all likelihood, by the terroristic nihilism underlying the Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv incidents—namely, the reckless attack on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and the shelling of the Physics and Technology Institute of Kharkiv, where there’s a nuclear reactor.
These things must not be underestimated. Putin is an arrogant ideologue who explicitly believes in resorting to brute force and subversion to humiliate the West and restore the Russo-Soviet Empire. What’s more, Putin is surrounded by people who think just like him, and this is the clique now concentrating, in their own hands, the most relevant share of political and military power in Russia. It’s self-evident you can’t trust Putin and his people to have sufficient sense not to get a very serious nuclear provocation going in the near future. By the way, and according to David Martin, CBS News correspondent in the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department, such a provocation could come by means of the Russians detonating a tactical nuclear weapon, a low intensity nuke, so as to threaten the U.S. and NATO with nuclear war and, in such a way, terrorize and paralyze everybody. Beware of something like that being perpetrated in the near future—for instance, against a Ukrainian city, or even a massing of Ukrainian troops in a rural area. The Kremlin’s already made it clear the name of the game is lawlessness.
Putin’s nuclear blackmail needs to be responded with unequivocal assertiveness. In the short term, you need to remind the Russians that, indeed, it’s a fact that Russia has nuclear weapons, but the truth is that the West has those too, and they’ll have less work than the Russians, since Russia has less large cities in its territory than the U.S. and Europe—so, it would make good sense to chill down, relax, and come to practical resolutions that will actually make some sense.
However, even that’s not enough. You need to start massively strengthening U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities right now. The priority here isn’t so much in increasing offensive capacity as much as it is in creating a potentially inviolable defensive nuclear shield. Annihilating the adversary is quite irrelevant when you yourself are being annihilated as well, and when the world as a whole is being turned into a nuclear wasteland. What you actually need is something that will prevent you from being annihilated and having to annihilate millions, perhaps billions, in return. This of course inevitably means a full comeback to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s, i.e., the idea of a highly technological nuclear shield, based around an integrated network of space, air and ground-based sensors (e.g. satellites) and directed energy interceptors (e.g. laser and particle beam systems), to detect, intercept and destroy incoming ICBMs. Once built and operating, an SDI nuclear shield will of course tend to render strategic nuclear weapons obsolete.
Also, at a later stage, you’ll need to rebuild the—in the meanwhile devastated, and reduced to a very precarious START Treaty—global nuclear treaty framework, in such a way as to establish dramatic limitations to strategic nuclear weapons and, in essence, to outlaw tactical nuclear weapons.
The Gordian Knot. Also, and throughout the diplomatic process as a whole, you have to place the following key question: is there any politically viable way to carry out successful regime change in Russia, and take Putin and his key apparatchiks out of the equation? This would, of course, tend to be the easiest and most expeditious way to settle this whole situation.
However, and in the (unlikely) case of that not being possible, the only sensible and realistic option is actually a gradual scaling down of tensions with the advance towards some uncomfortable type of a détente—despite with the Ukraine war going on in the background. That, of course, would signify a new Iron Curtain: a new geopolitical East-West divide that could preferably be attenuated by a Cold War like continuity of relations with Europe, by means of countries such as Germany, Italy, and Turkey.
And also the following. The fact that the present crisis is providing context for some groups and organizations to act on certain people’s instincts towards xenophobic repression and violence, here towards Russian diasporas, is something that’s simply ugly, not to say just vulgar. We’re in this to confront a totalitarian tyranny, not to turn into one. And, we’re in this in the name of human values, not to lose our souls.