Back to the nuclear crossroads

This article was originally published at the Daily Kos.

The war in Ukraine is quickly becoming a protracted war, with Russian military might consistently bogging down in the face of heroic resistance by the Ukrainian people. However, this war also represents the much wider reality of Russia starting a geopolitical confrontation with the West. As such, it must be dealt with vigorously, by means of unwavering support to the Ukrainians, immediate measures to dramatically strengthen NATO capabilities in Eastern Europe, unflinching steps to counter Putin’s nuclear blackmail, and assertive diplomacy to instill some type of reality principle to the Kremlin. Yet, things must be done in such a way as won’t intractably antagonize Russia and the West, since Such a scenario would easily give rise to a European war and, then, to a thermonuclear war. An article by Miguel Garrido, in Portugal.

Photo by Jorono at Pixabay

A terrorized population. A whole country, vandalized. Entire cities, encircled and besieged—huge sections of those systematically shelled and bombed, occasionally by means of such criminal implements of inhumanity as cluster munitions and thermobaric vacuum bombs. Mass migrations of millions of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, while thousands of those who remain behind are senselessly killed under siege, or even brutally murdered under occupation. And then, critical infrastructures just blown up, alongside residential areas, schools, churches, hospitals, and clinics—the arbitrary destruction of billions of dollars worth of essential, human life sustaining infrastructure. And, of course, explosive projectiles shot into the close vicinities of nuclear installations, in Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv.

Such are the impacts of the Kremlin’s brutality in Ukraine. In their strategically befuddling attempt to reassert imperial power and retrieve the old Russo-Soviet Empire’s proximal sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Moscow has already managed to destroy large sections of Ukraine, to precipitate a potentially intractable, no-win war, and, to gear the world towards a geopolitical faceoff between powers.

It must be clearly understood that Putin’s Russia means never to leave Ukraine alone and, indeed, that it will not restrain itself to Ukraine. If the Russians ever manage to achieve a significant hold over Ukraine—particularly over the Black Sea coast and the eastern third of the country—they will, in all probability, venture into Moldova, by way of their Transnistrian military enclave in the Moldovan east, and then, later, they’ll most likely turn to Georgia, at the other side of the Black Sea-Caucasus energy system.

The West must therefore engage in all possible efforts to counter Russian aggression, help Ukraine carry on with its gallant efforts and beat the invasion, and effectively dissuade the Kremlin from launching any further offensives on other countries. Essential here will be sustained, unwavering and consequential support for the Ukrainians, geared towards enabling them to decisively defend and retake territory, achieve battlefield victories over Russia’s military Leviathan and, essentially, repel and bog down Russia’s invasion—as a prelude, however, to having Kyiv restore control over the entirety of its territory.

(You may have noticed that the war in Ukraine has a clear potential to be turned into a new and improved version of the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s; the kind of scenario whereby Russia gets bogged down in a war with an intractable opponent, while being severely weakened by that. Perhaps there are some in the West who would be tempted to make the most of that, thereby conceptualizing assistance to Ukraine as an effort in providing Kyiv with just the sufficient military aid it needs to bog Russia down but not to really beat the invasion. However, the fact is that the purpose with this war doesn’t consist of senseless geopolitical games, but rather of having Ukraine and the Ukrainians win the war—which would be the greatest defeat one could inflict on Putin’s impetus for aggression, anyway.)

However, it’s also true that Russia is a thermonuclear power, and that we now find ourselves back in the nuclear crossroads. This being so, while it’s necessary to demonstrate unrelenting assertiveness towards Russian aggression, the fact is that countering Moscow must be done in such a way as will not insurmountably antagonize Russia and the West, since that would tend to drive the situation out of control. It would mean risking the unthinkable: a rapidly escalating war in Europe, ultimately turning into a thermonuclear war.

The present situation finds its most relevant precedent in nothing less than the nuclear contest of the Cold War.

Back in the Cold War era, when you had the two sides engaging each other across the world, there was a tacit, mutually accepted set of ground rules. Force would be responded with force, and provocations would be responded with strong assertiveness. However, force would be measured so it would never lead to open confrontation. Also, none of the sides would ever do anything to irreversibly aggravate the other, or to definitely collapse the diplomatic and commercial bonds between sides. There would invariably be leeway for diplomatic negotiations, and there would always be backchannels for essential negotiations. Those principles worked then, and they would certainly work now. So, let’s see how they apply to the present crisis.

The here-to approved sanctions are generally adequate. They already inflict a heavy blow on Russian finance and industry, severely punish the political elite and the oligarchs, and set the stage for mass popular disaffection towards the Putin regime. Also, those sanctions could be added to as time goes by and Russia perseveres in its aggression—just as they could easily be rethinked as soon as an appropriate change either in government policies or (what’s less likely) in the government itself takes place in Moscow. Additionally, and in the meantime, the current sanctions regime doesn’t force Russia into complete international isolation, in such a way making clear that the West is still available for dialogue.

There’s still a wide range of sanctions available for application to the Russian state, as well as to relevant Russian persons and interests. Application of those should be gradual and clearly conditional to the Kremlin’s behavior. Yet, as sanctions are being established, it’ll be essential to keep in mind that it’s necessary to preserve an essential minimum of bonds of interdependence with Russia that will allow for a successful continuity of the diplomatic process. For instance, if Europe was to fully boycott Russian natural gas, that would in itself be the end of the last great bond of interdependence between Europe and Russia, and, as such, also an end to any viable sort of diplomatic process. So, and while Europe must find other natural gas suppliers to quickly and effectively make up for its dependence on Russian gas, the fact is that, absent an extreme scenario, it should all the same keep a bare minimum of Russian gas imports going, so as to preserve a measure of interdependence.

Sanctions must, of course, be accompanied by clear demonstrations of strength in Eastern Europe.
This means unwavering assistance to the Ukrainians must be combined with assertive support to Moldova and Georgia, and, with a truly massive reinforcement of NATO conventional capabilities in the East.

Absolutely no policies that would put Western forces face to face with Russian forces. Such policies would of course include the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, by which NATO forces would be in charge of protecting Ukrainian skies from Russian MiGs, helicopters and missiles. But they would also include the open conduction of Ukrainian military operations from NATO territories. For instance, having the Ukrainian air force flying out of Poland or Romania. Instead, supply the Ukrainians with the state of the art in anti-aerial and anti-missile systems—in really vast amounts—, so they can independently reinforce and protect their air space, as well as any surviving airstrips in western Ukraine. Then, in the same spirit, it would be essentially unfathomable to send Western troops into Ukrainian territory to fight Russia. Equally unthinkable would be any preemptive strike against Russian or Belarusian forces. And, I really don’t need to talk about first strike options and scenarios here, or do I?

Massively check the Russians in the East. It’s absolutely clear there needs to be a massive strengthening of NATO’s conventional capabilities in Eastern Europe. This won’t just require deeper engagement by the U.S., but also, quite clearly, significantly increased defense contributions by European countries.

Also, at another level. The Ukrainian and Moldovan and Georgian applications to the EU should be clearly and unreservedly accepted as soon as possible—or, at the very least, the EU must establish intensely deeper formal institutional bonds with those countries. Yet, it should be made explicit that accepting Finland and Sweden into NATO will come about as a reciprocal response to the transformation of Belarus into a military instrument of the Russian Federation.

What’s more, Moldova and Georgia, even if they don’t become members of NATO anytime soon, they’ll still need to be militarily reinforced by Western governments—anti-aerial and anti-tank equipments, especially those of the lightweight variety, seem to be the most appropriate option. There certainly are ways of supplying such equipments in a politically acceptable way. For one, at the formal level, it must always be those countries themselves who are seen taking the initiative to procure such equipments. And then, the deals should be preferably announced and carried out during times when the Russians are taking particularly heavy institutional and media flak for their brutal tactics in Ukraine.

...and assist the Ukrainians by every means possible. Stating the truism that the West must have a careful approach to Russia and making considerations on diplomatic caution and savoir faire must not prevent the West from assisting Ukraine in all possible and feasible ways. Ukraine can’t go down with the West standing by. That’s an entire people that’s being assaulted and brutalized right now, and that’s only happening for that people’s desire of belonging to Europe and the West—as well as for Putin’s will to geopolitically confront the West. As such, we’d better explore all possible avenues by which to help the Ukrainians.

So, the West needs to carry on with its mass logistical support to Ukraine. In particular, the West needs to supply them with more and more light weight anti-aerial and anti-tank weapons. The Russians have thousands of MiGs, helicopters, tanks and armored vehicles to unleash on Ukraine, and that’s the only way Russian forces get an edge in the battlefield. So, give the Ukrainians the means to fight those. And, if possible, also give them stationary anti-missile systems, for the protection of any Ukrainian cities where it’s feasible to move such systems into.

Some have even proposed supplying weaponry, equipment and goods to the Ukrainians under a Lend-Lease program. Why not? In a deep sense, it would be very much appropriate to assist Ukraine under a program dating back to the fight against Nazi imperial aggression. It would add even more international and cultural legitimacy to the Ukrainian cause, it would presumably bolster international assistance for their national defense effort, and, it would further help represent the Russian invasion for what it actually is: a brutal, Nazi-like war of aggression.

Also, humanitarian assistance. Dramatically expanding aid to fleeing populations, particularly at the Polish, Moldovan and Romanian sides of the border, is indeed essential, but it’s not enough. Several Ukrainian cities are either already under siege, or about to become so. If it’s feasible at all, then why not organize humanitarian air bridges to those cities, whereby tons of supplies would be dropped by parachute? Also, placing humanitarian and religious missions on the ground could be a good idea as well. While probably being utterly necessary to ensure assistance to civilians and the wounded, a strong humanitarian presence in Ukraine's cities would also highlight Ukraine's respectability and dignity, while symbollically conveying, to the world and especially to Russia, how plainly immoral it is to be attacking Ukraine's communities and its people. However, such a thing should never imperil humanitarians' lives, meaning it would be essential to make sure humanitarian teams never ran the slightest risk of being turned into human shields, and that they absolutely would not get caught in the middle of hostilities. So, their locations and operations would invariably need to be well planned, communicated and discussed in advance with the Russian high command, and, whenever possible, widely announced to the world at large.

A diversified, closely coordinated approach. Effectively engaging with the Russians will require assertive diplomacy, conclusively backed by unwavering support to the Ukrainians, alongside the massive reinforcement of NATO forces and means in Eastern Europe. However, a consequential diplomatic approach to this situation will also require establishing a diversified, closely coordinated approach, by which the U.S., the EU, Great Britain, NATO, Poland and the Baltic states, among others, would carry on with a posture of intransigent force towards Russia, while other actors, such as Turkey, Austria or Hungary, would open mutually acceptable doors for dialogue with Moscow.

What’s happening in Asia? In the meantime, and while all of this is going on, the West needs to pay proper attention to what’s going on in Asia. In other words, how are the Chinese, the Arabs, the South Asians and the Central Asians reacting to this? It’s a really simple question here. Russia is a weakened power that can only hope to resort to any consequential form of imperial adventurism while antagonizing its Western trade partners and running the risk of being sanctioned to the ground if it feels it can count on some measure of Asian passivity, or acquiescence, or even backing, especially when it comes to trade and commercial relations. Are those things there? If so, then the fact is the West does have its means to exert constructive diplomatic influence across Asia, and it’s probably a good time to make use of them. Russia must not be allowed to find backing in Asia, as be it in the key fields of commerce, finance and technology.

Instilling something like a reality principle to the Kremlin. It’s thoroughly necessary, throughout the diplomatic process, to remind the Russians that, just as Putin’s Russia means never to leave Ukraine alone, so will the West never cease backing the Ukrainians—and, after that, the Moldovans, the Georgians and anyone else.

Then, it’ll be necessary to tell them, yes, it’s well understood that Putin’s regime intends to carry on vandalizing Ukraine, tearing its infrastructure to shreds, collapsing Ukrainian society, destroying the Ukrainians’ military capabilities and looting their industrial and nuclear capabilities. And, likewise, it’s fully understood that the Kremlin intends to break Ukraine up into partitions, enclaves, and provinces of the Russian Federation, or, at best, turn it into a land-locked state, deprived of any access whatsoever to the Black Sea. However (remind them of this), the fact is that, even now, it’s not being easy. Moscow’s offensive in Ukraine is being slow, it’s hampered by serious supply and logistical issues, demoralization is rampant among Russian troops, and those same Russian troops are having a hard time battling the Ukrainians and subjugating civilian populations. The result of this is that, even though the Russians enjoy clear force superiority, the Kremlin’s offensive is bogging down, and it’s suffering casualties and losses which, while still hard to quantify, seem to be nonetheless considerable. To the point where the Kremlin is now having to bring Syrian mercenaries and others into Ukraine.

So, what next? With all likelihood, a protracted, intractable war. And, as the Kremlin well knows, there will never be a lack of Ukrainian troops, nor of weaponry supplied to them, in Ukrainian territory. Therefore, such a war will tend to be fought by means of conventional combat, special operations, anti-tank systems, battle drones, surface-to-air missiles, etc. Such an adventure will inflict constant casualties and—in and of itself—grave economic damage to Russia. It could actually turn out to be even worse than the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s. It will seriously hurt Russia and the Russians, and, it could lead to widescale discontent within Russia itself. That of course is something Russia, a weakened power that it is, can’t afford.
This being so, (remind Moscow of this) it would make perfect sense for Russia to start rethinking its purposes in Ukraine, even the war in Ukraine itself, as well as to not attempt, in any type of proximate future, to put itself in even direr straits by means of similar assaults on countries like Moldova, Georgia, or even others.

Next, it’ll be useful to remind them that the Russo-Soviet Empire no longer exists, and that it’s really not coming back, and that the catastrophic policies that Putin’s Kremlin is now adopting to bring it back could very well be leading Russia itself towards the same end.

After all, as the Kremlin well knows, Russia is an especially debilitated power, with its decrepit industry, its dependence on foreign technology imports, its economy absolutely relying on cheap oil and natural gas exports, the weak average standard of living, and an ethnically divided population that’s only really been kept together over the past decades by means of centralized control and enforcement. What’s more, that population is an ageing one, and it’s composed of a mere 145 million people—almost all of those concentrated west of the Urals. Additionally, Russian voters tend not to trust the regime, and only give Putin electoral majorities on account of Putin’s image as a ‘keeper of economic stability,’ and, of course, for a basic lack of alternative electoral options, in what amounts to a de facto dictatorship. Well, what will the Russian population think of Putin when the economy starts collapsing all over, and when they start seeing their boys returning home in body bags? Here, the West should remind Moscow that their population has no interest whatsoever in the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions, nor in any “new great patriotic war” that Putin might conjure up.
And then there are also the oligarchs, the intelligentsia, the apparatchiks, and the generals, who (even though they’re controlled and intimidated) are growingly disillusioned, while perhaps not even understanding for sure why is it that Russia is trying to conjure up a geopolitical clash with the West.

So, when diplomatically interacting with the Kremlin, the West would need to remind them of all those points, and of how precarious their situation really is. And the West would then also have to make them notice that, rather than persisting in a failed imperial agenda, it would be far more preferable—for Russia, the Russian people and the Kremlin itself—to have Moscow instead choosing to gradually attenuate geopolitical conflict and, as a matter of fact, wind down its high hopes for conquering and taking over Ukraine.

All the while, the West would, of course, need to keep pushing ahead with sanctions and with all possible military support for Ukraine, so as to bolster and strengthen it to the utmost. The goal should be to build what now seems impossible: force superiority for Kyiv and a chance for Ukraine to not just stop Russia in its tracks in the invasion, but also take back its now occupied territories.

Additionally, the West and Western media should also be speaking to the Russian oligarchical class in general, so as to make them aware of the aforementioned points concerning Russia’s weakness, but also to make them understand that they have two options. The first option is that they acommodate to Putin’s present foreign policy, while the second is that they exert clout over Putin and the upper echelons of the regime so as to actually make them change policies towards a more human-friendly direction. In this, it should be made clear that a continuance of Putin’s current foreign policy inevitably equates to hardship and probable military defeat in Ukraine, economic and social misery in Russia, and a protraction and increase in sanctions. On the other hand, if the regime could be made to change courses so as to give up its geopolitical confrontationalism with the West, while at the same time giving up on its invasion of Ukraine, then things would be comparatively ok. Russia could then avert a military disaster in Ukraine, and Western sanctions would be relaxed, to the relief of Russia’s economy and Russia’s commercial enterprises. There would probably still be the creation of a new Iron Curtain stretching out from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus, from Kaliningrad to Abkhazia, but the negative impacts of that could be attenuated somewhat by a Cold War like continuity of relations with the West, as be it through Hungary and Turkey.

Russia wages war as an exercise in patience and perseverance, and patience and perseverance are abilities the West must master itself, if it intends to effectively and decisively counter Russia and ensure Ukraine’s victory.

Putin’s regime will hardly ever give up on Ukraine, unless it’s compelled to, and the only way to achieve that is by means of the patient, unflinching and perseverant exercise of assertiveness. This means carrying on with and extending the sanctions regime. And, it means cutting off Russia’s exits in Asia by consistently engaging its potential partners across the continent with skillful diplomacy. It also means making persistent use of a clear and assertive messaging when talking to the Kremlin and to Russia’s oligarchy. And, of course, more than anything else it means tirelessly and incessantly providing Ukraine with the military support it needs, so as to enable it to achieve concrete and decisive military victories over Russia. An eventual Russian decision to quit Ukraine may take awhile, but it will only truly ever come about by means of Ukraine consistently and convincingly managing to achieve victory on the battlefield.

Challenging Putin’s nuclear blackmail. It must also be very clearly recognized that Putin is now resorting to nuclear blackmail. That’s precisely what is expressed by Putin’s constant threats to the West, by the Kremlin ordering Russian strategic forces into a state of nuclear readiness, and also, in all likelihood, by the terroristic nihilism underlying the Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv incidents—namely, the reckless attack on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and the shelling of the Physics and Technology Institute of Kharkiv, where there’s a nuclear reactor.

These things must not be underestimated. Putin is an ideologue and a former KGB who, therefore, explicitly believes in resorting to brute force and subversion to humiliate the West and restore the Russo-Soviet Empire. What’s more, Putin is surrounded by people who think just like him, and this is the clique now concentrating, in their own hands, the most relevant share of political and military power in Russia. It’s self-evident the West can’t trust Putin and his people to have sufficient sense not to get a very serious nuclear provocation going in the near future. By the way, and according to David Martin, CBS News correspondent in the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department, such a provocation could come about by means of the Russians detonating a tactical nuclear weapon (a comparatively low intensity nuke), so as to threaten the U.S. and NATO with nuclear war and, in such a way, terrorize and paralyze everybody. Beware of something like that being perpetrated in the near future—for instance, against a Ukrainian city, or even a massing of Ukrainian troops in a rural area. The Kremlin’s already made it clear the name of the game is lawlessness.

Putin’s nuclear blackmail needs to be responded with unequivocal assertiveness. In the short term, the West needs to remind the Russians that, indeed, it’s a fact that Russia has nuclear weapons, but the truth is that the West has those too, and, as everyone knows, a nuclear war can not be won, so it must never be fought—therefore, it would make good sense to chill down, relax, and come to practical resolutions that will actually make some sense and work for the good of Humanity and life on this planet, not against it.

However, even that’s not enough. The U.S., the British and the Europeans need to start massively strengthening their nuclear defense capabilities right now. The priority here isn’t really increasing offensive capacity, but rather creating a potentially inviolable defensive anti-nuclear shield.

Now, the sort of calculations and speculations one occasionally hears about the “feasibility of winning a nuclear war”, or “the ability to strike while being striken”, or “annihilating the adversary”, and other such dystopian inanities, aren’t at all what's necessary. What’s needed is a way to avoid being annihilated by a nuclear rival, while also preventing the planet from being turned into a nuclear wasteland.

That of course inevitably means a full comeback to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s. The SDI, remember, was organized to establish a highly technological nuclear shield, based around an integrated network of space, air and ground-based sensors (e.g. satellites) and directed energy interceptors (e.g. laser and particle beam systems), to detect, intercept and destroy incoming ICBMs. Once built and operating, a fully-enabled and constantly updated SDI nuclear shield would essentially have the ability of neutralizing and reducing to nought any nuclear ballistic missile attack—even one by means of MIRV warheads—and it would, in effect, render war by means of strategic nuclear weapons obsolete.

So, this is the kind of stuff the West needs to go for.

Also, at a later stage, the West will need to take the lead in rebuilding the—in the meanwhile devastated, and reduced to a very precarious START Treaty—global nuclear treaty framework, in such a way as to establish dramatic limitations to strategic nuclear weapons, as well as to, in essence, outlaw tactical nuclear weapons and derived dirty bombs.

The key question. Also, and throughout the diplomatic process as a whole, the West has to place the following question: is there any foreseeable future wherein the Russian people could successfully dissolve the Putin regime in Russia, thereby removing Putin and his key apparatchiks from the Kremlin? Such a scenario would, of course, not only potentially liberate Russia from tyranny but also possibly settle this whole geopolitical situation.

Still, and whether that kind of scenario is realistically plausible or not, the only sensible and realistic option for the West while Putin and his people remain in power, would actually be to prepare itself for a new Iron Curtain: a new geopolitical East-West divide that could preferably be attenuated by a Cold War-like continuity of relations with Moscow by means of some European countries.

And also the following. The fact that the present crisis is providing context for some groups and organizations to act on certain people’s instincts towards xenophobic repression and violence, here towards Russian diasporas, is something that’s simply ugly, not to say just vulgar. We’re in this to face up to a totalitarian tyranny, not to turn into one. And, we’re in this in the name of human values, not to lose our souls.